

*** Document 1 of 13 for CUST ***

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TEXT

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 DIRNSA TO OSCAR/UNIFORM SIERRA ZEM S E C R E T SAVIN SECTION
 THREE OF FOUR XXMMENP03-TB01038 2/0/VCK-E/R41-67 ISHTAR
 SUPPLEMENT 3 AVC KUS AVIA-A DOCT-A INSE-A OPER-M/E I. THE
 ISHTAR DESIGNATOR APPLIES TO ALL PORTIONS OF THIS REPORT.
 THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM SIGINT-REFLECTED
 OPERATIONS AND POSTURE XXCC 1. DRV MIG-21,S SHOOTDOWN AN
 EB-66 AN APPARENTLY COORDINATED DRV AND KOREAN MIG-21 MISSION
 ON 14 JANUARY RESULTED IN THE SUCCESSFUL SHOOTDOWN OF AN
 EB-66 AIRCRAFT. THE ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT AND SHOOTDOWN WAS
 ACCOMPLISHED BY TWO DRV MIG-21,S BUT THE FLIGHT PATTERN
 OF A SINGLE KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-21 PROVED INSTRUMENTAL TO
 THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION. SIGINT REVEALS THAT TWO DRV
 MIG-21,S WERE SCRAMBLED SOUTH FROM PHUC YEN AT LOW ALTITUDE
 IN THE DIRECTION OF THE ORBITING EB-66. AT THE SAME TIME
 A LONE KOREAN-PILOTED MIG-21 WAS VECTORED AT NORMAL KOREAN
 MIG-21 REACTION ALTITUDE N.E. OF PHUC YEN IN A WIDE SWEEP
 AROUND KEP AIRFIELD. THE KOREAN FLIGHT WAS POSSIBLY STAGED
 TO INSURE THAT MIG CAP FLIGHTS REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE
 MAIN STRIKE FORCE INGRESSING FROM LAOS AND AWAY FROM THE
 EB-66. THE STRIKE FORCE HOWEVER ABORTED ON TANKER AND
 THE MIG CAPS CONTINUED INTO THE DRV TO CONDUCT A FREE LANCE
 MIG SWEEP. THE DRV MIG-21,S CONTINUED ON COURSE TO THE AREA
 OF THE EB-66 ORBIT. MIG CALLS WERE
 ISSUED ON THE KOREAN FLIGHT AND POSSIBLY ON THE DRV MIGS
 BUT MIG CAP PILOTS WERE UNABLE TO CONFIRM THE TARGETS. SOME
 MEASURE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY WAS
 EVIDENCED WHEN THE GCI CONTROLLER ADVISED THE MIG LEAD THAT
 WE HAVE PICKED UP THE HOSTILE ON RADAR VERY GOOD WE HAVE
 THE TIME AND AREA DETERMINED WELL BUT CANNOT BROADCAST IT..
 WHEN THE MIGS HAD ARRIVED AT A POINT NEAR 19-50N 105-30E
 THEY WERE DIRECTED BY THE GCI CONTROLLER TO WAIT UNTIL
 THE TARGET MAKES CLIMBING TURN THEN ATTACK.. THUS IT IS
 EVIDENT THAT THE GROUND CONTROLLER HAD CALCULATED THE EB-66
 ORBIT AND WAS ABLE TO SELECT THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TIME
 AND POSITION FOR THE MIGS TO INITIATE A FIRING PASS. IF
 THE MISSION OF THE KOREAN FLIGHT WAS IN FACT TO DRAW ATTENTION
 AWAY FROM THE DRV PILOTS ATTACKING THE EB-66 THEN IT MUST
 BE CONSIDERED A SUCCESSFUL ONE SINCE THE DRV MIGS WERE NOT

SIGHTED BY THE U.S. MIG CAP PILOTS UNTIL AFTER THE EB-66 HAD BEEN DOWNED AND THE MIGS WERE EN ROUTE TO RECOVERY AT PHUC YEN. 2. KOREAN AND DRV GCI CONTROLLERS CONDUCT UNIQUE TRAINING EXERCISES ON 7 JANUARY. SIGINT REFLECTED KOREAN GROUND CONTROLLERS AT KEP AIRFIELD IN WHAT APPEARED TO BE A GCI TRAINING EXERCISE FOR TWO NEW CONTROLLERS. ONE EXPERIENCED KOREAN GROUND CONTROLLER ASSUMED THE ROLES OF TWO MIG PILOTS WHILE TWO DIFFERENT AND APPARENTLY NEW PERSONNEL CONDUCTED GROUND CONTROL FOR THE SIMULATED INTERCEPT. ACTUAL U.S. STRIKE AIRCRAFT OVER NVN WERE USED AS TARGETS FOR THE EXERCISE AND THE ASSOCIATED VECTORING REFLECTED ON VHF TACTICAL VOICE COMMUNICATIONS APPEARED AUTHENTIC. HOWEVER ALL THE SPEAKERS INCLUDING THE SIMULATED PILOTS USED GROUND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND THE CONTROLLER WHO PERFORMED AS TWO MIG PILOTS USED ONE TRANSMITTER FOR ALL COMMUNICATIONS. THE EXERCISE WHICH TOTALED ONLY SIX MINUTES IN DURATION WAS DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE TWO TRAINEES EACH BEING ALLOWED TO VECTOR FOR THREE MINUTES. SIMILAR EXERCISES LONGER IN DURATION AND MORE PRECISE IN VECTORING WERE CONDUCTED BY DRV CONTROLLERS AT GIA LAM AND BAC MAI ON 28 AND 23 JANUARY. ON EACH OCCASION THE EXERCISES WERE CONDUCTED DURING PERIODS OF U.S. STRIKE ACTIVITY OVER NVN AND THE U.S. FLIGHTS WERE USED AS TARGETS APPARENTLY TO LEND REALISM TO THE EXERCISES. THE RADIO FREQUENCIES FOR THESE EXERCISES WERE APPARENTLY SELECTED SO AS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH NORMAL VHF TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN PROGRESS AT THE SAME TIME. THE TRAINING OF NEW GCI CONTROLLERS UNDER THE CONDITIONS DISCUSSED ABOVE MAY POSSIBLY BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTIVATION ON THE VINH AND BAI THOUNG AIRFIELD FACILITIES. XXHH 900
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